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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
Section 78-2a-3(2)(k). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether Thiokol marshalled the evidence, and showed 
that in spite of such heavy evidence, the court's Findings were 
clearly erroneous. 
2. Whether, contrary to Thiokol's claim that the court 
used tort-based principles of fault in its decision, the trial 
court correctly applied contract principles in determining the 
case, as indicated in the Findings of Fact. 
3. Whether the trial court correctly found that a new 
contract was formed between Thiokol and Fiberglass Structures for 
the reparations of the tanks, regardless of whether the new 
contract is styled a modification or novation. 
4. Whether Thiokol, in accepting the repaired tanks, knew 
or should have known that they may be defective, waived any 
defects in the tanks, and obtained what they specified. 
5. Whether the trial court correctly found that this was a 
contract case, disregarding Thiokol's non-independent, non-
contractual theories of recovery. 
6. Whether Thiokol waived any right to claims by reason of 
their substantial modifications after acceptance. 
1 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Questions of law are reviewed for correctness. The trial 
court's interpretation of the contract is a question of law. 
Crowther v. Carter, 767 P.2d 129 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
If a contract is ambiguous and the trial court finds facts 
respecting the intentions of the parties, the viewing Court must 
review the evidence and all inferences in a light most favorable 
to the findings of the trial court. Kimball v. Campbell, 699 
P.2d 714 (Utah 1985). 
To mount a successful challenge to the correctness of the 
trial court's findings of fact, an appellant must first marshall 
the evidence supporting the findings and demonstrate that the 
evidence is legally insufficient. Findings of fact will not be 
set aside unless clearly erroneous. Reid v. Mutual of Omaha 
Insurance Co., 776 P.2d 896 (Utah 1989). 
The trial court's judgment may be sustained on grounds 
different from those relied upon by the trial court. Global 
Recreation v. Cedar Hills Development, 614 P.2d 155 (Utah 1980). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a contract case. The facts cited by Thiokol are but 
part of the factual basis for the trial court's decision. 
In 1988, Interwest Construction (hereafter "Interwest") 
contracted with Thiokol Corporation (hereafter "Thiokol") to 
construct a waste water treatment facility, M705, for Thiokol 
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(Exhs. 35 and 36J.1 Interwest entered into a subcontract with 
A. H. Palmer & Sons (hereafter "Palmer") for the mechanical 
portion of M705 (Exh. 37). Palmer's subcontract included three 
(3) waste water storage tanks for $90,000.00. 
Palmer, unable to use local subcontractors, contracted with 
Fiberglass Structures to build the three tanks (Exh. 2). Palm-
er's purchase order required Fiberglass Structures to build the 
tanks according to Thiokol's plans and specifications. 
Thiokol's specifications and approvals contained the follow-
ing pertinent requirements: 
1. A minimum wall thickness of 1/4" (Tr 1928) (Exhs. 7, 8, 
9, 144). 
2. The fill and empty cycling of the tanks would be by 
gravity flow from tanks T5, T6, T7 and T8 situated inside Build-
ing 705. These tanks were smaller tanks than the 35,300 gallon 
outside storage tanks. When desired, the 2Jt pipes connecting the 
storage tanks would allow them to slowly seek the level of the 
inside tanks (Tr 1946, Tr 148-149).2 
Because the inside tanks and the storage tanks were the same 
elevation (Tr 181), it was impossible to fill T32, T33 and T34 
tanks completely if operated in accordance with the plans and 
specifications (Tr 1946, 148, 337, 377). 
1
 "Exh." refers to trial exhibits. nRn refers to the record. "Tr* refers to the transcript of trial 
testimony: "DepP refers to depositions used as evidence. 
2
 Because the tanks could not be filled, the hoop stresses cited by Thiokol could not be 
achieved. Therefore, the safety factors based upon hoop stress cited by Thiokol experts are inaccurate. 
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3. Operation was specified at ambient air pressure. The 
clear meaning thereof is that the tanks would not be subject 
either to positive or negative pressures during their operation. 
Expert witnesses testified that had the tanks been used as 
contemplated by the plans and specifications, the tanks as 
manufactured would have been serviceable (Tr 2132-33). 
Pre-fabricated vertical panels of the tanks were shipped by 
Fiberglass Structures, bolted together, and bolted to the con-
crete floor in a specially formed keyway (Tr 1935). The top was 
bolted to the sides and fill pipes connected. 
Upon completion, on April 30, 1989, tank T34 burst during a 
trial test. The reason for the failure was a design error by 
Fiberglass Structures in the joint connecting the vertical 
sections (Tr 1934). Fiberglass Structures admitted fault (Tr 
1936), and suggested to Thiokol a method of repair (Tr 1936). 
On May 2, 1989, Thiokol inspected the plant, notified 
Interwest that it was "substantially complete," and accepted the 
work of Interwest and its subcontractors (Exhs. 45, 167). 
Thiokol then sent a letter to the contractor complimenting it on 
it's completion (Exh. 48). According to Thiokol's project 
engineer, Gene Gladys, the contract was complete except for a 
punch list of a few small items (Gladys Dep. pp. 132-33, 211-12; 
Tr 674-75, 1482, 1748-49). The fix of the tanks was not part of 
the small items left to complete the original contract (Gladys 
Dep. pp. 135-136; Tr 1749). 
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Thiokol undertook direct negotiations with Fiberglass 
Structures in the approval, engineering, and supervision of the 
repair of tanks 32, 33 and 34, after the initial failure (Find-
ings of Fact, paras, 11, 12; Exhs. 13, 15, 148, 149; Tr 681, 670, 
1745-48, 1549, 1472, 1550-51, 1748, 1751-52, 1872). 
The tanks were reinforced as directed by Thiokol, along the 
failed vertical joints and not along the center portions of each 
side-wall panel (Tr 1936-38, 1854-55, 1862, 1868). 
Sometime after June 18, 1989, Thiokol, without the knowledge 
of Interwest, Palmer or Fiberglass Structures, modified the tanks 
from gravity fill, as designed and specified, to pressure fill 
(Tr 147, 2083, 1285, 1304). The addition of the pumps was a 
major change to the system (Tr 1307, 1765, 1775, 1946; Exh. 18). 
Thiokol's change from gravity fill, ambient pressure, to 
pumping, using high volume pumps, was in violation of the guaran-
tee given by Fiberglass Structures to Thiokol (Exhs. 36, 18; Tr 
1946). 
Building M705 was operated by a semi-automated system 
involving complex instrumentation. The operation board was 
called a Nemitron (Exh. 304). The pumping modification by 
Thiokol included the addition of two double diaphragm pumps 
plumbed parallel into a 4" manifold leading to each of the three 
tanks. The pumps were manually operated through manual valves 
which lacked any instrumentation (Tr 147, 2083). 
Thiokol's modified pump system filled the tanks through the 
center of the top of each tank by a 4" pipe (Tr 1332, Tr 151). 
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Thiokol's Exh. 304 reveals that many times prior to the failure 
of T33 on August 24th, the tanks were filled by the pumps to 
capacity. The testimony of the employees indicates that by the 
pumps the tanks sometimes overflowed, and Thiokol employees had 
to clean up the spill (Tr 281-82). 
In the early morning hours of August 24, 1989, T33 ruptured, 
spilling its contents into the containment area. The Thiokol 
employees testified that immediately prior to the rupture, the 
pumps were running, filling tank T33 (Tr 154). However, the same 
employees claimed they turned the pumps off. Exh. 304 shows 
waste water moving from the inside of tank T5 to T33 at the time 
of rupture. The Nemitron printout shows that at 5:18 on August 
4th, T33 contained 29,206 gallons of water (Exh. 304). Thirty 
minutes latesr at 5:48, T33 had filled by more than 3,000 gallons 
to 32,148 gallons. The tank burst some time after 5:48 a.m. and 
before 6:18 a.m. The Nemitron shows that T5 continued to empty 
after the tank burst indicating that the pumps were running at 
the time T33 ruptured (Exh. 304; Tr 170-3, 238-41, 318). A 
Thiokol employee, admitted that he stated in his deposition that 
he turned the pumps off one hour prior to the rupture. However, 
he testified in court he turned the pumps off only minutes before 
the rupture (Tr 318). Rysgaard was told by Thiokol that the 
pumps were running at the time of T33's rupture (Tr 1959). The 
trial court found that the tanks had been overfilling for some 
time prior to the rupture (Memorandum Decision p. 5; Findings of 
Fact, paras. 27, 28). The operation of the pumps created an 
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uplifting force of approximately 17,000 pounds (Tr 2136-38, 604-
05). The tanks were neither designed nor built for such loads 
(Tr 1946-50). Failure would not have occurred had the tanks been 
filled by gravity flow as designed (Tr 1951). 
After the tank ruptured Thiokol revealed, for the first 
time, the pumping modifications to the tanks (Tr 1942, 1285). 
Modifications to the tank, by Thiokol, violated the express 
warranty given to Thiokol by Fiberglass Structures (Exhs. 18-36), 
and caused Val Palmer of Palmer to deny liability (Tr 1303-50). 
The trial court, in its Memorandum Decision (Appendix A) found as 
follows: 
The reason for the failure of T33 has not been demon-
strated to this court's satisfaction to be a result of 
non-compliance by the defendants with the terms and 
provisions of the contract. (p. 2) The overhead 
filling method, did, however, allow for overfilling of 
the tank which the court finds was the most likely 
cause of the failure and such overfilling would not 
have occurred had the gravity feed system remained in 
place. (p. 5) 
In this connection testimony is persuasive to this 
Court that the most effective likely cause of the 
failure was the overfilling of the tank causing uplift 
which the tank was not designed to withstand, (p. 5) 
Lack of use of negligence language by the court. Thiokol's 
Statement of Facts and other portions of their brief contain 
language relating to "negligence" which was never used by the 
trial court in its Memorandum Decision nor in its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law. These statements by Thiokol are not 
supportable by the facts or the record. For instance, as a 
statement of fact, Thiokol says without citation: 
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The trial court accepted that invitation by finding 
that Thiokol had negligently prepared its specifica-
tions , negligently accepted the fix of T34 and negli-
gently caused the failure of T33. 
(Thiokol Br, p. 19). 
The statement of fact is a figment of Thiokol's imagina-
tion.3 
Factual support for Findings of the Court. Supported by 
evidence, the court made and entered a Corrected Memorandum 
Decision (Appendix A), Third Amended Findings of Fact, Conclu-
sions of Law (Appendix B) and a Second Amended Judgment (Appendix 
C). Thiokol cited only small portions of the supporting facts. 
The following are some of the critical Findings of Fact by 
the court and citations to the evidence, disregarded by Thiokol, 
supporting those Findings. 
1. THE COURT FOUND THAT AFTER THE INITIAL FAILURE OF T34, 
THIOKOL UNDERTOOK A DIRECT CONTRACTUAL, RELATIONSHIP 
WITH FIBERGLASS STRUCTURES FOR THE REPAIR OF T32 AND 
T33 AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF T34 (Findings of Fact, 
para. 11). 
A
* The first failure of T34 occurred on April 30, 
1989: the original contract was substantially complete before the 
refitting of the tanks. The original contract was declared 
substantially complete on May 2, 1989 except for a punch list of 
small items. (Exh. 167; Gladys Dep. 132-33, 211-12; TR 674-675, 
^Throughout the Statement of Facts Thiokol attempts to insert the word "negligence" where the 
Court had not used the word, in an effort to create error by the trial court. The trial court did not use 
negligence language in determining a contract case. Negligence language was not used by the court in 
its Memorandum Decision and was not repeated in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law yet 
it is stated as fact in the Thiokol Statement of Facts with such repetition that it leads the reader to 
believe that it must have been used by the court and counsel in the trial. Such is not the case. 
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1482, 1748-1749). At that time, the fix of the initial failed 
tank had not yet been negotiated, accepted or completed (Tr 1749) 
(Gladys Dep. 135-36; Tr 1749). 
Jody Wood, administrator for Thiokol testified that the 
replacement of the failed tanks was not part of the original 
contract (Tr 681-82). Under the original contract no agreement 
was valid without a change order, and no change order covered the 
repair (Tr 468-69, 670; Exhs. 34, 35). Wood testified that the 
only change order in the original contract was to allow Fiber-
glass Structures to build the tanks when the original subcontrac-
tor could not complete the project (Tr 670-71). 
B. Thiokol sought a direct extended warranty from 
Fiberglass Structures. Under the original contract all parties 
were required to provide a one-year warranty (Exh. 4; Tr 1756-
57). On May 2, 1989, Palmer gave Thiokol a one-year warranty for 
all materials installed by Palmer under the original contract 
(Exh. 52; Tr 1471-72, 1482, 1746). In the last ten years Thiokol 
had never required more than a one-year warranty from Palmer (Tr 
1481-82). The repair of T34 and the fix to T32 and T33 occurred 
after Palmer gave its one-year warranty (Tr 1752). 
A one-year warranty is common in the industry (Tr 1735-36). 
The extended warranty direct from the manufacturer was highly 
unusual and of an uncommon length of time (Tr 1481, 1756). 
After the first failure Thiokol hired an independent engi-
neer who recommended that the original tanks be discarded. He 
ultimately advised Thiokol to get an extended warranty from 
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Fiberglass Structures if they decided not to discard the tanks 
(Tr 1856-58, 1861, 1864-65). 
Thiokol had reservations about attempting to repair the 
original tanks, but decided to go ahead if they could get a 
warranty direct from the manufacturer (Tr 1752-53). Wood, 
Thiokol's contract administrator, advised getting an extended 
warranty directly from Fiberglass Structures (Tr 693). 
Dr. Maurice Glasso, Thiokol's expert, would recommend 
seeking an extended warranty from the fabricator (Tr 413-14). 
Thiokol required Fiberglass Structures to give a three-year 
warranty to Thiokol (Gladys Dep. 102-04; Tr 1481, 1490; Exhs. 37, 
191, 18). The warranty excluded modifications to the tanks 
(Exhs. 37, 191, 18). Thiokol sought no extended warranties from 
Palmer or Interwest (Tr 1489). The extended warranty was Thio-
kol 's requirement and was a matter of contract negotiation 
between Thiokol and Fiberglass Structures (Tr 1490, 1630). 
C. Thiokol negotiated a new contract with Fiberglass 
Structures for the fix of T32, T33 and the remanufacture of T34. 
Palmer and Interwest were out of the loop (Findings of Fact, 
para. 12). Fiberglass Structures proposed the fix to Thiokol 
employees including the project engineer and the chief contract 
administrator (Tr 1746, 1551). Fiberglass Structures negotiated 
directly with Thiokol; Palmer was not aware of eill negotiations 
(Tr 1745-48; Gladys Dep. 160; Exh. 12, pp. 2-3; Exhs. 13, 15, 74, 
100, 148, 149). Palmer made no proposal to fix the tanks (Tr 
1550-51). Palmer had no expertise in determining what fix would 
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work (Tr 1472-73). Fiberglass Structures and Thiokol had such 
experience (Tr 1472-73, 1550-51). The correspondence concerning 
the proposed fix went from Thiokol to Fiberglass Structures and 
returned, with Palmer on occasion acting only as a conduit (Exhs. 
13, 15, 148 and 149; Tr 1741-42, 1744-46). Palmer was not aware 
of all the negotiations (Tr 1745-48). For instance, Thiokol hid 
from Palmer that Brent Thomas had recommended that Thiokol 
discard the tanks, which Thiokol refused to do (Tr 1751-52, 
1872). 
Thiokol never asked Interwest or Palmer to replace or fix 
the tanks after the first failure, according to Thiokol's Jody 
Wood (Tr 681-82). Thiokol's project engineer, initially hesitant 
about the fix, checked all calculations and approved the fix (Tr 
1551). Thiokol accepted the fix, and Thiokol's project engineer 
gave the go ahead (Tr 1748, 1752). 
2. THE TANKS WERE BUILT TO THIOKOL'S DESIGN. SPECIFICA-
TIONS AND AS SUCH WERE UNDER-DESIGNED, (Findings of 
Fact, paras. 23, 24) 
Brent Thomas, hired by Thiokol, stated that Thiokol's 
specifications for the original tanks were deficient in contain-
ing no design criteria, no safety factors, no temperatures nor 
operational features (Tr 1845). Thiokol failed to request coupon 
tests or calculations from Fiberglass Structures concerning the 
original tanks (Tr 1846). Dr. Glasso, Thiokol's expert, agreed 
that Thiokol's specifications incorporated only the "require-
ments" of NBS PS15-69 and not any statement, suggestion or 
illustrations (Tr 381-82; Exh. 5). He agreed that NBS PS15-69 
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was only applicable to tanks under 12 feet in diameter, but the 
tanks were 20 feet in diameter (Exh. 6, Section 3.6.1, p. 9; Tr 
386, 424, 1592, 1636-37, 1877-78). NBS PS15-69 states that it 
only applies to standard size tanks, up to twelve feet in diame-
ter (Exhs. 6, 169). See also, Point VI, below. Glasso admitted 
that the specifications don't state a safety factor (Tr 417), nor 
strength requirements for woven roving (Tr 418). 
Following the failure of T33 on August 24, 1989, Mr. Love-
less, an engineer for Thiokol, wrote new specifications for 
replacement tanks (Exh. 506). These specifications were drafted 
to prevent cimbiguities or misunderstandings in the original specs 
and to ensure Thiokol would get a good product (Tr 846, 848-49, 
851-53 and 859-60). The differences between the* new specifica-
tions (Exh. 506) and the old specifications (Exh. 183) clearly 
illustrate that the original tanks were under-d€*signed by Thiokol 
and that the original specifications resulted in just what 
Thiokol received. 
The new specifications contained the following new or 
additional requirements: 
(1) Required testing of the resin content of the tanks 
to insure a valid product (Tr 851-52). 
(2) One-hundred mile an hour wind specifications (Tr 
856). The original specs required less than building code 
requirements. 
(3) The lid with enough strength to hold the snow load 
plus one mem to remove the snow (Tr 856). 
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(4) Ability to withstand a positive and negative 
internal pressure because of added pumps (Tr 858-59). The 
original tanks were to be at ambient air pressure. 
(5) An increased temperature range (Tr 860). 
(6) A broader range of PH requirements (Tr 864). 
(7) A .538 inch wall thickness, more than double that 
earlier approved by Thiokol (Tr 865; Exhs. 7, 8, 144). 
(8) An SPI report never mentioned in the original 
contract (Tr 865). 
(9) Much emphasis on better design and control of the 
product (Tr 1613, 1614, 1615, 1618, 1619# 1620). 
(10) Drawings, calculations and tests (Tr 850). 
3. THIOKOL FAILED TO PROVE THE REASON FOR THE FAILURE OF 
T33 ON AUGDST 24. 1989. (Findings of Fact, paras. 19, 21) 
A. Thiokolys experts failed to prove the cause of the 
collapse. Dr. Glasso, Thiokol's main expert, admitted he could 
not determine what caused the failure (Tr 448). He was only able 
to see one edge of the failure and would need to see the compli-
mentary edge to determine the cause (Tr 356-57). He was, at 
most, "suspicious" that the lack of sufficient overlap may have 
caused the problem, but could not state any cause with reason-
able probability (Tr 356). Dr. Tullis, Thiokol's hydraulics 
expert, testified that if the side-walls of the tanks were three 
times as strong as the expected hoop stress of 3,000 psi, he 
could not account for the failure (Tr 2132-33). The side-walls 
were that strong. See C , below, at 15. 
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B. The lack of overlap was not proven to be the cause 
of the collapse (Findings of Fact, paras. 20, 21). Mr. Young-
keit, Thiokol's in house failure analyst, stated that the tank 
failure probably began at the bottom of the tank (Tr 482). He 
found 5/8 inch overlap in the woven roving along the break high 
towards the top, however, he didn't study the full length of the 
failure area (Tr 484), because he didn't save that critical 
portion of the tank (Tr 490-91). 
After the August failure of T33, Thiokol performed tests to 
determine the sidewall strength. Samples, shaped like dog bones, 
were pulled apart. The samples did not fail at the overlap, but 
at mid-panel or mid-cloth (Tr 518-19; Exhs. 329-31). The dog 
bone samples were taken close to the failed area but half way up 
the tank (Tr 518-19). 
C. The lack of strength of the side-wall of the tank 
was not shown to have caused the collapse. (Finding of Fact 21) 
Mr. Youngkeit, Thiokol's analyst, stated that the tested samples 
from the failed tank showed a hoop strength of 11,246 psi (Tr 
496, 520, 528). The maximum expected hoop stress at the base of 
the tank is 3,180 if the tanks were completely full (Tr 377; Exh. 
301). The tanks were designed to be filled by gravity flow and 
thus could never be completely full (Tr 148). Thus the maximum 
3,180 psi hoop stress could never be achieved (Tr 377). 10,000 
psi would yield a safety factor of 3.15 or greater (Tr 377). 
Maurice Glasso indicated that a tank could be built to a safety 
factor of 3 but he would expect a good stress analysis (Tr 365). 
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Mr, Youngkeit suspected other factors than glass content as the 
source of the failure (Tr 499-501). 
The actual safety factor may have been more than 5 to 1. 
The tanks could only be filled approximately 2/3 full as the 
emptying tanks were smaller than the receiving tanks (Tr 1529). 
Therefore, the hoop stress at the bottom of a tank would be 2/3 
of the hoop stress of a full tank or about 2,000 pounds, yielding 
a safety factor of more than 5 to 1, not 3.15 to 1 as suggested 
by Thiokol. 
D. Lack of thickness in the glass fabrication was not 
shown to be a cause of the failure. Gene Gladys, Thiokol's 
project engineer, placed his stamp of approval on submittals by 
Fiberglass Structures showing a .25 inch wall thickness (Exhs. 7, 
8, 144). Mr. Youngkeit stated the least thickness he could find 
on the failed tank was .246 inches, only 4/1000 less than Thio-
kol 's approved .25 (Tr 524). One-quarter inch wall thickness 
would be sufficient for 12,000 pounds psi of hoop stress (Tr 369-
70). Thiokol's tests indicated wall strengths of 10,000 to 
12,000 psi and 15,000 to 22,000 psi, the differences resulting 
from the vagaries of the testing, not the strength (Tr 375). 
4. THIOKOL KNEW OF SIGNIFICANT SAFETY CONCERNS AND NOT-
WITHSTANDING ACCEPTED THE TANKS. (Findings of Fact, paras. 23, 24 
and 25) 
A. Thiokol was warned of significant problems with 
the tanks after the first failure and prior to the repair. 
Thiokol was advised to discard the tanks. Brent Thomas, an 
independent consulting engineer hired by Thiokol to review the 
15 
tanks after the first failure, warned two representatives of 
Thiokol, Eddings and Gladys, that the tanks should be discarded 
(Tr 1856-58, 1861, 1864-65; Exhs. 11, 134). 
Thomas recommended that Thiokol test the tanks to determine 
the side-wall strength and other mechanical properties such as 
tensile strength, bending stress, etc. (Tr 1847). He felt that 
the wall thickness was inadequate (Tr 1856-57, 1860, 1865). 
Thiokol refused to do the simple test recommended by Thomas (Tr 
1847, 1855, 1871). Gladys, the project engineer, instructed 
Thomas to concentrate on the splice plate fix over the narrow 
joints (Tr 1865, 1875, 1899, 1904). Thereafter, Thomas deter-
mined that the fix would make the narrow, vertical joint strong 
enough (Tr 1867, 1903-04). Thomas did not recant his concern 
about the inadequacy of the mid-panel, side-wall thickness, nor 
his recommendation that the tanks be discarded (TR 1867). Gladys 
stated that Thiokol had other engineers who had serious doubts 
about attempting to repair the original tanks (Tr 1553). 
Thiokol never gave Thomas information on original manufac-
ture, design, calculations or drawings (Tr 1870-71). 
Dr. Eastman, Thiokol's main expert, testified that had he 
been Thiokol he would have discarded the tanks (Tr 617). 
Many experts were available at Thiokol for testing (Tr 843, 
480, 1553). It is not uncommon in the industry to contract 
independent experts to perform tests for Thiokol to decide 
whether to keep the tanks (Tr 1594, 1599). 
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Dr. Glasso, Thiokol's expert, stated he would not have 
approved 1/4" wall thickness which was the thickness specified by 
Thiokol (Tr 406). Alan Loveless, a Thiokol engineer, felt that 
Thiokol should require a specimen test during the manufacture of 
a product as an appropriate way to insure Thiokol obtains a 
proper product (Tr 852). Thiokol specified double the side-wall 
thickness of the original tanks for the replacement tanks (Exh. 
508). 
Acoustical emissions tests could have been performed by 
Thiokol after the first failure but were not (Tr 1614, 1617). 
Thiokol's contract administrator, had definite reservations about 
attempting to repair the tanks (Tr 1752). 
The facilities engineering department of Thiokol, after 
completely reviewing the fix of the tanks and having received 
warnings from experts hired by them, accepted the fix by Fiber-
glass Structures (Tr 691). 
Thiokol got what they specified, reviewed and approved with 
knowledge and warning (Tr 1654). 
B. Thiokol failed to obtain minimum necessary re-
quirements . Before he would accept the tanks, Dr. Glasso would 
want design drawings, calculations, tensile strength and hardness 
tests (Tr 406-07), none of which Thiokol sought. 
Sophisticated owners require calculations (Tr 1600). 
Thiokol did not require or approve calculations from Fiberglass 
Structures common to the industry (Tr 1596-97): 
(1) No seismic calculations (Tr 1599-1600, 1617-18). 
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(2) No wind loading calculations (Tr 1600-01). 
Thiokol accepted a wind load less than the minimum required under 
the Uniform Building Code (Tr 1620). 
(3) No snow calculations (Tr 1601). 
(4) No calculations of standard laminate thickness or 
strength (Tr 1601, 1607). Thickness calculations are simple to 
perform (Tr 1601-02, 1605). Test coupons of the manufactured 
materials were not required nor tested. Thiokol either waived, 
overlooked or ignored them (Tr 1608, 1621-22). 
Thiokol approved a 1/4" wall thickness (Exh. 168; Tr 1606). 
Because Fiberglass Structure's manufacturing processes were 
novel, so Thiokol should have taken extra precautions to insure 
an appropriate product (Tr 1607). Owners are responsible for 
providing inspectors at the manufacturing site and at the assem-
bly site (Tr 1608-09). The tanks were under-designed and under-
scrutinized by Thiokol (Tr 1622). 
C. Thiokol accepted the subcontractors and their 
work. Thiokol reviewed all submittals of plans and specifica-
tions for equipment on the project and accepted the same (Tr 683, 
686, 1737). Thiokol could reject any subcontractor or supplier 
(Tr 687). Subcontractor lists were provided to and reviewed by 
Thiokol (Tr 687), who accepted Fiberglass Structures (Tr 1734-
35). 
5. THE ORIGINAL TANKS DESIGNED FOR GRAVITY FILLING AT 
AMBIENT AIR PRESSURE WERE SUBSTANTIALLY CHANGED BY THIOKOL TO BE 
FILLED BY TWO HIGH PRESSURE PUMPS ALLOWING OVER-FILLING. LIKELY 
CAUSING THE! FAILURE, (Findings of Fact, paras. 26, 28) 
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A. Over-filling was impossible with the designed 
gravity fill system. The smaller interior tanks T5, T6, T7 and 
T8, by gravity, filled the exterior tanks T32, T33 and T34, about 
2/3 full at maximum (Tr 1529). 
B. By using the after-installed pumps, Thiokol had 
overfilled the tanks (Tr 1491). Once, Palmer was called to 
investigate a "leak," but the pumping had overfilled the tank, 
leaving inches of water in the containment area around the tank 
(Tr 1565, 1583). Photographs show white residue on the entire 
inside of the tanks (Exhs. 319-31, 334-38). 
C. The overfilling of tanks by Thiokol. using pumps 
causing an uplifting force. likely caused the rupture of the tank 
on August 24. 1989. Dr. Paul Tullis, Thiokol's hydraulic expert, 
testified that overfilling the tanks would cause an uplifting 
force between 7,000 and 28,000 pounds (Tr 2136, 2138). 
Dr. Eastman, Thiokol's expert, testified that overfilling 
would create 11,000 pounds of uplift (Tr 604-05). Dr. Glasso, 
stated that the failure was not inconsistent with upward pressure 
(Tr 357-58). 
D. The tanks were neither designed nor constructed to 
withstand an uplifting force. Failure would not have occurred if 
the tank had been filled by gravity (Tr 1957). Fiberglass 
Structures would not have completed its contract had it known 
about the intent to install pumps (Tr 1946). The addition of the 
pumps caused a substantial change in the tanks (Tr 1307). 
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Val Palmer acknowledged that he would not have consented to 
the addition of pumps by Thiokol and that such constituted a 
substantial change (Tr 1765). 
From all of the above, it is clear that the lower court's 
Findings were well supported by the record. 
POINT I: THIOKOL HAS FAILED TO MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTING 
THE COURT'S FINDINGS AND SHOW THAT IN SPITE OF THE EVIDENCE THE 
COURT'S RULING WAS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
Rule 52a, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs the appel-
late review of a court's findings of fact. That rule states: 
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary 
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly errone-
ous , and due regard shall be given to the opportunity 
of the trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses• 
In Matter of the Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 85 (Utah 1989), 
cited by the* court, below, the court held that: 
When an appellant claims that the evidence is insuffi-
cient to support the trial court's findings of fact, . 
. . great deference is given to the trial court's 
findings, especially when they are based on an evalua-
tion of conflicting live testimony. (Citations omit-
ted) . 
Id. at 886. 
In order for this Court to judge whether or not the Findings 
of Fact are "clearly erroneous," the plaintiff has a heavy burden 
to carry* that is, to marshall the evidence in support of the 
Findings and demonstrate that despite this evidence the decision 
is clearly erroneous. In The State v. Harrison, 783 P.2d 565 
(Utah App. 1989), the court stated: 
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Although Wanda (Appellant) asserts that the court's 
findings are not supported by the evidence, she has the 
burden to convince this court of her assertion. Her 
burden is a heavy one in that she "must marshall the 
evidence in support of the findings and then demon-
strate that despite this evidence, the trial court's 
findings are so lacking in support as to be xvagainst 
the clear weight of the evidence,'' thus making them 
v Nclearly erroneous.'' In Re Estate of Bartell, 776 
P.2d 85, 86 (Utah 1989, quoting State v. Walker, 743 
P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)). See also, Scharf v. BMG 
Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1077 (Utah 1985); Harder v. 
Condominiums Forrest Glen, Inc., 740 P.2d 1361, 1362 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Id. at 566, n.l. (Parenthetical added). 
In Cornish Town v. Koller, 758 P.2d 919 (Utah 1988), the 
court held that, "To mount a successful challenge to the trial 
court's findings . . . an appellant must marshall the evidence 
supporting the . . . findings." Id. at 922. The court held that 
because the appellants had "failed to make such a showing in this 
case, the trial court's determination (as to that finding) will 
not be disturbed." Id. at 922 (Parenthetical added). 
In the present case, Thiokol has failed to marshall the 
evidence in support of the Findings of Fact and failed to show 
that in spite of such evidence, the court's Findings are clearly 
erroneous. Many examples can be cited of the failure to marshall 
the evidence, including the following Findings and supporting 
facts: 1) Thiokol undertook a direct contractual relationship 
with Fiberglass for the repair of the tank (See Facts, above at 
8-11); 2) the tanks were built to Thiokol's design specifications 
and Thiokol obtained what it designed and specified (See above at 
11-13); 3) Thiokol failed to prove the reason for the failure of 
the tank (See above at 13-15); 4) lack of overlap was not proven 
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to be a cause of the collapse (See above at 14, para. B); 5) lack 
of strength was not shown to have been a cause of the collapse 
(See above at 14, para. C); 6) lack of thickness of the side-wall 
was not shown to be a cause of the failure (See above at 15, 
para. D); 7) Thiokol was warned of significant problems with the 
tanks which may result in further failures, yet refused to 
perform simple tests to confirm the tank integrity, and accepted 
the tanks with knowledge of such defects (See above at 15-19); 8) 
the original tanks were modified to allow filling through pumps 
which resulted in unexpected pressures, including vertical uplift 
of several thousand pounds (See above at 19-20); 9) Palmer was 
left out of the loop of negotiations over the new project and was 
never informed that Thiokol's engineers recommended discarding 
the tanks (Tr. 1751-52, 1872); 10) the plans and specifications 
did not include a 10 to 1 safety factor (See above at 11-12); 11) 
Thiokol approved a one-quarter inch wall thickness which require-
ment was met by the manufacturers (See above at 15, para. D.); 
and 12) the most likely cause of the accident was the uplifting 
forces which Thiokol's addition of unexpected pumps after the 
completion of the contract occasioned (See above at 19-20). 
Because Appellant has failed to marshall the evidence, which 
Palmer has now been required to do, and because Thiokol has 
failed to show that the court's reliance upon all of that evi-
dence is clearly erroneous, the appeal should be dismissed. 
Besid€5s failing to marshall the evidence and show the 
Findings clearly erroneous, Thiokol has often cited facts sup-
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porting its position without mention of the massive contrary 
evidence. In effect, Thiokol is asking this Court to view the 
evidence in a light most favorable to its position rather than in 
a light most favorable to Palmer, as required.4 
POINT II: THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY USED CONTRACT DEFENSE PRINCI-
PLES SIMILAR TO TORT DEFENSES TO DETERMINE THAT RESPONDENTS HERE 
NOT AT FAULT. 
A. Assumption of Risk includes three concepts, one in tort, 
one in contract. Even the tort aspect is a defense in contract. 
Somehow Thiokol asserts that the lower court, in finding that 
Thiokol "knew or should have known" of the defective condition, 
was improperly applying tort principles in contract (Thiokol Br. 
at 23). The court did use contract principles. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that tort defenses, 
such as the former assumption of risk, apply in contract. In 
Jacob Constr. v. Structo-Lite Eng. Co., 619 P.2d 306 (Utah 1980), 
the court considered facts very similar to those at bar. Subcon-
tractors had created allegedly faulty storage tanks. In this 
pre-Beck case5, the trial court had submitted both tort and 
contract claims to the jury. The court held that assumption of 
risk involved three legal concepts, one in contract and one in 
4
 The Court should note that, in contrast, Palmer does not rely solely on its own evidence, but 
often cites to Thiokol's own experts and consultants to show how favorable the evidence was. See, e.g. 
references to testimony of Gladys, Glasso, Eastman, Youngkeit, and Wood. 
See Point III, below, concerning the Beck case and the appropriateness of contract rather 
than tort principles applying. 
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tort, "a mere* phase of contributory negligence." Even the latter 
tort concept would apply in contract: 
• . • [S]ince the jury was instructed that the damages 
resulting from the breach of warranty were the same as 
for negligence, the finding of assumption of risk 
applies equally to both the negligence and the warranty 
claims. 
Id. at 312 (Emphasis added). The court described the con-
tract/tort issue, under assumption of risk as: 
Whether a reasonably prudent man in the exercise of due 
care (a) would have incurred the known risk and (b) if 
he would, whether such a person in the light of all of 
the circumstances including the appreciated risk would 
have conducted himself in the manner in which plaintiff 
acted. 
Id. at 310 (Emphasis added). 
In Moore v. Burton Lumber & Hardware Co.. 831 P.2d 865 (Utah 
1981), another pre-Beck (See n.5, above) case, the court specif-
ically held that one of the three concepts of assuming a risk is 
in contract: 
With time it has become clear that the assumption of 
risk defense in fact includes at least three different 
legal concepts. See Jacobson Construction Co. v. 
Structo-Lite, . . . the vprimary express' form involves 
an agreement by the plaintiff to accept the risk or 
danger, . . . Secondary assumption of risk is, as 
stated, the unreasonably encountering of a known and 
appreciated risk and in reality an aspect of contribu-
tory negligence. 
Id. at 869-870 (Emphasis added). The court went on to talk about 
"that part of assumption of risk which is an aspect of contribu-
tory negligence," implying others are not. Id. at 870. 
In Vernon v. Lake Motors, 488 P.2d 302 (Utah 1971), cited 
favorably in Jacobson, above, the court held that assumption of 
risk was a defense in breach of warranty contract: 
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On the subject of contributory negligence as a defense 
to a cause of action based on breach of warranty, the 
imminent authority Prosser says: 
VA few decisions have said flatly that it is 
not.' [Citing cases]. The great number have 
said quite as flatly that it is. [Citing 
cases]. * * * Those which have permitted the 
defense all have been cases in which the 
plaintiff has discovered the defect and the 
danger and has proceeded nevertheless to make 
use of the product. They represent the form 
of contributory negligence which consists of 
deliberately and unreasonably proceeding to 
encounter a known danger, and overlaps as-
sumption of risk. 
Id. at 304-305 (Emphasis in the original). In that case, the 
court held that if the plaintiff had reason to know of the defect 
and possible danger and voluntarily accepts it, then that party 
cannot recover in contract: 
We accept as correct for this purpose: that if the 
plaintiff knows of the defect and the danger, but 
nevertheless vdeliberately and unreasonably' goes 
ahead, he should be precluded from recovery. 
Id. at 305. Specifically speaking of whether that conduct 
applies in tort or contract, the court stated: "We further think 
that the nicety of terms should not be of controlling impor-
tance." Jtd. at 305. Thiokol tries to rely on such niceties. 
In Meese v. Brigham Young University, 639 P.2d 720 (Utah 
1981), the court does away with one of the three types of assump-
tion of risk in contributory negligence, leaving its use in 
other, e.g. contract cases: 
No longer, then, under the rulings of this court, is 
Assumption of the risk' to be treated separate from 
contributory negligence in comparative negligence 
cases. 
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Id. at 726. The Restatement also affirms that a party which 
obtains that which is expected should not be able to recover 
damages. Restatement of Contracts, § 344, statess: 
Judicial remedies under the rules stated in this Re-
statement serve to protect one or more of the following 
interests of a promisee: (a) vHis expectation inter-
est,' which is his interest in having the benefit of 
his bargain . . ., (b) his vreliance interest,' which 
is his interest in being reimbursed for loss caused by 
reliance on the contract . . . . 
Certainly Thiokol's expectation and reliance was that it had 
reason to believe it may be getting an inferior product which may 
someday fail. The failure did not damage Thiokol's expectation 
or reliance on the contract. Thiokol got what it bargained for. 
Restatement of Contracts, § 346(1) states: 
The injured party has a right to damages for a breach 
. . . unless the claim for damages has been suspended 
or discharged. 
In the present case, Thiokol was warned of possible defi-
ciencies in the product, yet accepted the risk. They were told 
that the tanks should be discarded or, at the very least, the 
side-wall strength tested, yet Thiokol refused. They knew that 
the side-wall was too thin, and that only the mirrow splice plate 
fix over the joint had been certified as structurally sound. 
They had concerns about the manufacturer. All this constituted 
knowledgeable assumption of risk properly found by the court. 
B. Waiver is the knowing acceptance of a risk in a con-
tract, and is also sometimes called assumption of risk. 
Besides assumption of risk, many courts have indicated that 
if a party accepts a defective product or other risk under a 
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contract knowing or having reason to believe that the product is 
defective, a waiver exists. 
In Anderson v. Brinkerhoff, 756 P.2d 95 (Utah App. 1988), 
the court considered a contract concerning a defective car which 
caught on fire. The court held that a party can waive rights or 
obligations under the contract: 
The failure of the parties to adhere to the precise 
terms of the contract, combined with the parties' 
failure to give any notice of their intention to insist 
on strict compliance with the terms of the contract, is 
ample evidence to support a finding that the parties 
waived strict compliance with the contractual terms. 
Citations omitted. 
Id. at 98 (Emphasis added). The court held that waiver can be 
implied from accepting performance not in strict compliance with 
the terms of the contract: 
Waiver can be implied from conduct, such as making 
payments or accepting performance which does not com-
port with contractual requirements. Citations omitted. 
Id. at 98 (Emphasis added). 
In Foley v. Horton, 780 P.2d 638 (N.M. 1989), the courts 
considered a homeowners' allegations of defects in construction. 
The court held that for the builders to establish waiver against 
the homeowners, the builders would have to show that the homeown-
ers "were aware of the building defects in their home upon 
acceptance and took no action, thus arguably waiving their rights 
to cure or damages." Id. at 639 (Emphasis added). The court 
found, however, that the defects were latent. 
In Epperson v. Roloff, 719 P.2d 799 (Nev. 1986), the court 
considered an alleged breach of contract for sale of a home with 
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a defective solar heating system. The court held that the mere 
occupation of the home could not constitute a waiver of contract 
without reason to know of a defect: 
In order to establish such a waiver, Respondents would 
have to establish that the Eppersons (new home owners) 
knew or had reason to know that the solar heating 
system was defective. Citation omitted. 
Id. at 804 (Parenthetical and Emphasis supplied). The court 
indicated that it was a question of fact whether or not the new 
homeowners "knew or should have known of the defcsct ....•' Id. 
(Emphasis added). 
In the present case, and as found by the court, Thiokol knew 
or reasonably should have known of any defects in the product. 
Thus their acceptance of the product constituted a waiver which 
barred their recovery of restitution or damages. 
C. The doctrines of assumption of risk and waiver apply to 
strict liability contract cases, and fit this case precisely. 
Strict liability does not apply in this case. See Point 
VIII, below. Even if it did, the Utah Supreme Court has estab-
lished that where a person accepts a possible danger, that person 
may not recover in strict liability when the danger materializes. 
In Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152 (Utah 
1979), a pre-Beck (See n.5, above) case on construction6, the 
court stated: 
When the user of a defective product knows or in the 
exercise of ordinary care should know of the defect in 
a product and of the danger inherent therein, the 
6
 See Footnote 1, above. 
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doctrine of strict liability in tort should not apply 
to harm occurring to the purchaser after such knowl-
edge. (Citation omitted). 
Id. at 158. In Hahn, the court held that the defenses in strict 
liability and breach of implied warranty are the same; 
[E]ssentially the same analysis for the purpose of 
determining defenses to breach of implied warranty 
parallels that for strict products liability. There-
fore the same defenses discussed under strict products 
liability are available under breach of implied warran-
ty. 
Id. at 159. 
POINT III: THIOKOL'S ALLEGATIONS IN TORT ARE NOT INDEPENDENT OF 
THE CONTRACT AND SEPARATELY ACTIONABLE. 
A. Thiokol is not entitled to assert tort claims: the 
contractual duties involved give rise only to contractual ac-
tions . Thiokol suggests that Respondents should be liable under 
tort theories. Thiokol's Br., Point III. 
The Utah Supreme Court has clarified that if parties arrange 
rights, duties and obligations under a contract, their cause of 
action for breach of those obligations is in contract and not in 
tort. In Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange. 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 
1985), the court considered whether or not a bad faith action 
between an insured and insurance company should be governed by 
contract, tort, or both. In the face of a majority of courts 
which turn to tort, fearing that contract law would not provide 
sufficient remedies, the Utah Supreme Court held that suits in 
contract provide all remedies necessary, and tort concepts are 
inappropriate: 
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[I]n first-party relationship (between an insurer and 
its insured), the obligations of the parties are con-
tractual rather than fiduciary. Without more, a breach 
of those implied or express duties can give rise only 
to a cause of action in contract, not one in tort. 
Id. at 800 (Emphasis added). 
Beck does not just apply to insurance contracts. The court 
recognized that the duties in Beck are similar to those "implied 
in all contracts and that a violation of that duty gives rise to 
a claim for breach of contract." Id. at 798. The court contin-
ued that courts recognizing tort theories have "had difficulty 
developing a sound rationale" for treating insurance contracts 
differently, that is, in tort, because those courts recognize 
that tort theories are not appropriate where non-insurance 
contracts are concerned. The court stated: "There is no sound 
theoretical difference between a first party insurance contract 
and any othesr contract," jEd. at 800, and: 
We further hold that as parties to a contract the 
insured and insurer have parallel obligations . . . 
obligations that inhere in every contractual relation-
ship. 
Id. at 801 (Emphasis added). 
Tort is appropriate only where independent acts give rise to 
such an action. In Culp Construction Company v,> Buildmart Mall, 
795 P.2d 650 (Utah 1990), the trial court had dismissed a tort of 
negligent misrepresentation, finding the matter a question of 
contract, consistent with Beck. The Supreme Court reasserted 
Beck that acts constituting a breach of contract lie in contract, 
but found that the defendant had not only breached the contract, 
but also independently represented that he was acting as an 
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abstractor. Therefore, he may be liable in tort for independent 
negligent misrepresentation not within the contract. Thus where 
independent acts result in the elements of a tort not within the 
contract, then a tort may be alleged. (See also, discussion of 
DCR v. Peak Alarm. below at 32, subpara. 3..) 
Although the court in Beck stated that "only" a contract 
claim is appropriate, the court recognized that where independent 
duties arise, not covered by the contract, a party may also 
recover for a breach thereof. The court used intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress as an example. Id. at 800, n.3. In 
the present case, the question thus becomes whether or not 
Respondents' tort claims were independent of the contract. They 
were not. See Subsect. 2, immediately below. 
B. Thiokol's tort allegations are the same as its contract 
allegations, not independent. All of Thiokol's claims are the 
same - a defective product. Thiokol's Cross-claim alleges that 
contractual duties were breached because the tanks supplied "were 
defective, inadequate, and non-conforming" (R940, para. 4). 
Thiokol's alleged damages for breach of contract are stated in 
para. 33 of the cross-claim (R940, para. 5). 
Thiokol's contract breach of express warranty claims assert 
that contracts for warranty (R942-43, paras. 15(a)(b)(d)), were 
breached because of "defects in design, manufacture or materials" 
(R943, paras. 15(a)(b), 16). Thiokol's alleged damages are the 
same, those in para. 33 (R943, para. 17). 
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Thiokol's negligence claims assert that the tanks "were 
defective in design and manufacture and were totally inadequate 
. . ." (R944, para. 20). Thiokol's alleged damages for negli-
gence are the same, those in para. 33 (R944, para. 21). 
Thiokol's strict liability claims assert that the tanks were 
"in a defective condition and unreasonably dangerous . . . " 
(R944, para. 25). Thiokol's alleged damages are the same, those 
in para. 33 (R945, para. 27). 
In both the contract and the tort claims, Thiokol merely 
alleges that the parties designed and produced a defective 
product. The contract dealt with providing a good product, thus 
all claims arise under the contract. No independent tort theo-
ries are even alleged. 
C. The above analysis of Thiokol's Complaint also illus-
trates Thiokol's misplaced reliance on DCR Inc. v. Peak Alarm, 
663 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983) (Thiokol's Br. at 22, 46-47). 
In DCR, the court examined the plaintiff's complaint and 
found a tort allegation independent of the contract, i.e. failure 
to warn of a known risk: "Such a duty to warn is nowhere ex-
pressed in the parties' contract; . . . " Id. at 434. The court 
held that in an ongoing maintenance contract, the service company 
had an independent tort duty to warn. In the present case, there 
was no ongoing maintenance relationship. Allegations, both tort 
and contract, were the same, that is, creating a defective 
product. The contract contemplated a non-defective tank, thus no 
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tort is alleged by Thiokol independent of the contract, as in 
DCR. 
D. A party which obtained that which it specified should 
not be able to later assert higher standards by implying non-
contractual theories, 
Thiokol's lengthy, detailed specifications set the standards 
and parameters for the tanks which they desired. Experts testi-
fied that Thiokol "got what they specified, reviewed, approved," 
and had installed with regard to the tanks. (Tr 1654:14-18). 
Now, because sophisticated Thiokol's standards were not 
sufficient for recovery/ Thiokol attempts to impose a higher 
standard through tort theories.7 
It is axiomatic in contract law that parties, especially 
sophisticated parties dealing in special products, can create 
their own bargain and are not bound by general implied duties. 
In Paul Mueller Co. v. Cache Valley Dairy Assoc., 657 P.2d 
1279 (Utah 1982), the owner attempted to hold subcontractors to a 
higher general manufacturer's duty of care, relying on WRH v. 
Econ. Builder's. 633 P.2d 42 (1981). The court held that even if 
WRH establishes a duty of care on a manufacturer, that duty would 
not apply where the parties are not supplying goods to unsophis-
ticated purchasers, but rather following the plans, specifica-
tions, and directions of a sophisticated purchaser: 
See Thiokol's argument that the Respondents had a duty to manufacture the tanks in 
accordance with the plans and specifications, onto a higher standard if other contractors may have 
done so under other contracts or circumstances. Thiokol's Br., Point II:B. 
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Appellants are not Manufacturers' comparable to the 
manufacturer in the WRH case. While the latter manu-
facture products destined for retail sale to unknown 
and potentially inexperienced purchasers, appellants 
provided their products and services to a presumably 
knowledgeable contractor in accord with detailed con-
tract specifications. 
Id. at 1286. The court held that the contract specifications, 
not general manufacturing duties, set the standards because of 
the sophistication of the parties. See also, Points VII and 
VIII, below. 
In the present case, sophisticated Thiokol specified the 
product they wanted, and they go what they specified. General 
manufacturing duties do not apply. 
POINT IV: THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE 
PARTIES MODIFIED THEIR CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIPS. (Findings of 
Fact, paras. 11, 12, 15) 
Thiokol seems to argue that the facts as found by the trial 
court do not form the requisites of a modification. The record 
shows an offer by Fiberglass Structures for the fix, negotiations 
as to terms and an acceptance by Thiokol. Thiokol received a new 
three-year warranty, negotiated separately and independently from 
the original agreement between Thiokol and Interwest (See Facts, 
above, at 9-12). A warranty unusual in the industry and negoti-
ated separately from the usual one-year warranties given by the 
parties (See Facts, above, at 9-12). 
The facts as found by the trial court support the legal 
conclusion that the parties modified the original agreement. It 
is to be noted here that the Thiokol does not argue that the 
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parties cannot modify their agreement. Provo City Corporation v. 
Nielson Scott Co., 603 P.2d 803 (Utah 1979) and Ted R. Brown & 
Associates Inc. v. Carnes Corporation, 753 P.2d 964 (Utah App. 
Ct. 1988). 
A. Thiokol argues that the law requires the breaching 
party to attempt to cure. Palmer does not disagree with the 
principle nor the authorities cited. 
The first failure occurred on April 30, 1989. The contract 
was to be performed by May 1, 1989. The time for performance had 
expired (Tr 688, Gladys Dep. 227). 
Thiokol had two options: (1) require new tanks; or (2) make 
an agreement for the fix of the existing tanks. Thiokol opted 
for the latter. The initial contract was declared substantially 
complete on May 2nd and the negotiations for the fix were started 
between Thiokol, using Thomas as their expert, and Fiberglass 
Structures (Exhs. 45, 134, 135, 1213, 148, 149 and 150). The 
trial court properly found that Interwest and Palmer were left 
out of the loop (Findings of Fact, para. 12; See Facts, above, at 
11-12). 
The trial court considered the exhibits showing direct 
negotiations (Exhs. 12, 13, 100, 148, 149) and how Thiokol used 
their independent expert Dr. Thomas to verify the fix. Thiokol 
directed Thomas to ignore the issue of the side-wall thickness 
and concentrate on whether or not the fix, using a splice, would 
work (See Facts, above, at 16-18). Gladys and Wood also ques-
tioned the sidewall strength but opted to approve the fix and 
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accept the tanks (Id.). In a highly unusual procedure not 
involving a change order to the original contract, Thiokol 
requested directly from Fiberglass Structures a three-year 
warranty (See Facts, above, at 9-10). Palmer hadf prior to this 
time, given a one-year warranty for their work performed by them 
(Id.). Thiokol now looked to Fiberglass Structures for satisfac-
tion and not to Interwest (See Facts, above, at 8-11). Gladys 
states that the fix was not a part of the original contract nor 
does the fix of the tanks appear as a punch list item for the 
completion of the original contract (Id.; Exhs. 140, 163). The 
fix is not represented by a change order (id.). Gladys testified 
that the fix was not part of the small items mentioned in the 
punch list needed to complete the project (id.; Exh. 163). 
The trial court found that the tanks were to be within 
specifications after the fix (Finding of Fact 23). Thiokol 
accepted the tanks and put them to use. 
Thiokol, throughout the trial, and in their brief, ignores 
their modifications to the tanks which the trial court found to 
be substantial (Finding of Fact 26). The ability to overfill the 
tanks most likely caused the failure (Finding of Fact 28). 
Thiokol asks for reversal of the trial court decision while never 
addressing the issues created by their modifications to the 
tanks. Thiokol claims that the trial court's remedy was "harsh" 
(Thiokol Br. p. 41, line 1) while ignoring their installation of 
high pressure pumps capable of causing uplifting forces on the 
tanks never contemplated by Interwest, Palmer and Fiberglass 
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Structures agreements (Tr 1946). The trial court's decision was 
not made in a factual vacuum and Thiokol cannot now ignore its 
own conscious decision to use pumps. 
B. Thiokol had contractual remedies with Interwest. 
Interwest had contractual remedies with Palmer. Palmer had 
contractual remedies with Fiberglass Structures. The usual 
procedure of change orders proceeding down the chain for approval 
was ignored by Thiokol because Thiokol negotiated a new contract 
directly with Fiberglass Structures for a fix of the tanks. The 
terms were a three-year warranty for the fix. Interwest and 
Palmer gave no three-year warranty (Tr 1238, 1753). The fix 
being a subject of a new contract with warranties, Interwest and 
Palmer were no longer concerned, and Thiokol never required 
either Interwest or Palmer to attempt the fix. Thiokol never 
rejected the tanks, although advised to the contrary. Thiokol 
contractually waived defects known to Thomas, Gladys and Wood, 
accepted the fix, accepted the tanks, and put them to use8. 
Thiokol implies that the parties cannot modify a contract by 
a new offer, acceptance and consideration, as a remedy to a 
difficult situation. Contract law does not bar a modification by 
the parties nor even a novation. (17A CJS §373 et. esq.) Utah 
case law acknowledges the ability of contracting parties to 
remedy difficulties by modification. In this case the modifica-
It is amazing that Thiokol would even consider the installation of pumps after receiving 
warnings from Thomas, Wood and Gladys. It could be argued that Thiokol had nothing to lose and 
everything to gain if the tanks failed. Their brief seems to reveal their philosophy. 
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tion was the agreement between Thiokol and Fiberglass Structures 
for the fix of a tank, a separate agreement not covered by a 
change order to the original contract nor a part of the punch 
list of items required to complete the initial agreement. There 
is evidence to support the trial court's Findings and the trial 
court can conclude as a matter of law that Thiokol and Fiberglass 
Structures modified the initial agreement with the fix and the 
three-year warranty(2)9. (See Facts, above, at 8-11). 
The trial court found Thiokol got what it bargained for 
(Findings of Fact, para. 23). That finding is not challenged by 
Thiokol who argues that it "should not be denied the right to 
revoke it's acceptance and sue for the breach" (Thiokol Brief p. 
42 line 3), but when? Before or after Thiokol made major sub-
stantial modifications to the tanks? Thiokol's argument implies 
that after it made the modifications it should be allowed to 
revoke its acceptance made prior to the modifications and sue for 
the breach after the modifications likely caused the failure. A 
novel argument but unrealistic and without legal authority. 
C. Thiokol argues that the attempted cure did not result 
in a change of Appellee's contractual obligations (Thiokol Brief 
p. 43). Thiokol cites a series of exhibits received by the trial 
court. In citing the exhibits Thiokol ignored other exhibits 
which could have been marshalled in support of the finding. The 
ThiokoVs argument is nullified by ThiokoVs addition of the pumps. Whatever agreement 
the parties may have had with Fiberglass Structures or for that matter with Interwest and A H. 
Palmers when Thiokol installed the pumps they voided all warranties. As the owner, fully aware of 
the weaknesses of the tanks, Thiokol and Thiokol alone chose the manner of use or abuse. 
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trial court found a modification of the contract through the 
introduction of exhibits and a testimony of witnesses (Exhs. 13, 
15, 148, 149, 100). (See Facts, above, at 8-11). 
Thiokol next claims that Palmer's burden of proof at trial 
is clear and convincing (Thiokol Brief p. 44, line 8). The 
burden of proof in contract cases is the preponderance of the 
evidence. 
There is credible evidence to show that the Interwest's 
contract was substantially complete. The fix was negotiated 
between Thiokol and Fiberglass Structures after the substantial 
completion of the principle contract10. 
In summary* the Findings of Fact of the trial court, unchal-
lenged by Thiokol, evidenced that the tanks, after the fix, were 
made to plans and specifications required by Thiokol. Thiokol's 
brief ignores substantial modifications to the tanks. Thiokol's 
refusal to deal with this issue renders their arguments moot. 
POINT V: ANT AMBIGUITIES IN CONTRACTS OR PARTS THEREOF, SUCH AS 
SPECIFICATIONS, SHOULD BE RESOLVED AGAINST THIOKOL. 
Thiokol alleges that some aspects of trade publications were 
incorporated into the specifications of this job by the contract. 
Utah law is clear and has long recognized that any ambiguities in 
a contract are resolved against the drafter. See Park Enterpris-
This argument is also moot The fix was negotiated and implemented prior to the 
installation of the pumps. The Trial Court found the tanks were built to specifications (Finding of 
Fact 23). The addition of the pumps was an election made by Thiokol without notice to any other 
party. After all Thiokol was the owner and could deal with their property as they wished, but in so 
doing must accept the loss as occasioned by their abuse of the property. 
39 
es v. New Century Realty. 652 P.2d 918, 920, (Utah 1982); Docutel 
Olivetti v. Dick Brady Systems, Inc., 431 P.2d 475, 479 (Utah 
1986), citing Park Enterprises. Thiokol drafted the contract and 
specifications in question. 
POINT VT: THE SPECIFICATIONS DID NOT REQUIRE A 10 to 1 SAFETY 
FACTOR IN SIDE-WALL STRENGTH, AND EVEN IF IT DID, THE RESULT 
WOULD HAVE BEEN THE SAME. 
The specifications incorporated only the "applicable re-
quirements of . . . NBS PS15-69," a technical publication (Exh. 
5, para. 2.02(E). 
Thiokol argues that NBS PS15-69 "requires" a 10 to 1 safety 
factor on side-wall thickness, and if a 10 to 1 factor had been 
used the tank would not have failed. 
Thiokol's argument fails because: 1) NBS PS15-69 doesn't 
apply to tanks of the size in question, 2) a 10 to 1 safety 
factor is not a "requirement" of NBS PS15-69, 3) Thiokol never 
proved what caused the failure, so a 10 to 1 factor on the side-
wall may not have changed failure, and 4) Thiokol specified a 
questionable wall thickness of .25" (Exhs. 7, 8, 144). 
First, NBS PS15-69 limits its application to standard sizes 
and types of tanks: 
Product standards are published voluntary standards 
that establish (1) dimensional requirements for stan-
dard sizes and types of various products, (2) technical 
requirements for the product . . . 
(Exh. 6 at Introduction). 
The only tanks mentioned in NBS PS15-69 are twelve feet in 
diameter or less. The tanks at issue were twenty feet in diame-
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ter. Therefore there are no "applicable" requirements in NBS 
PS15-69. 
Second, the only reference to a 10 to 1 safety factor in NBS 
PS15-69 is in a footnote to a chart which describes characteris-
LICS of some smaller fiberglass tanks. The specific reference 
states that the table is "based on a safety factor of 10 to 1, a 
liquid specific gravity of 1.2" (Exh. 6 at p. 11). Nothing in 
the chart or the footnote "requires" a 10 to 1 safety factor, nor 
a specific gravity of 1.2 for liquid contents. If Thiokol's 
argument is correct, all liquids in such tanks would be required 
to have a certain specific gravity also. NBS PS15-69 did not 
require tanks to contain only liquids of 1.2 specific gravity. 
The lack of a "requirement" is especially apparent when the rest 
of NBS PS15-69 is compared, which is replete with statements that 
things "shall" be done or are "required." 
All Thiokol had to do if they wanted a 10 to 1 safety factor 
would be to add a few words to the specs such as "side-wall 
strength shall have a 10 to 1 safety factor." Instead, in spite 
of their contract to the contrary, they try to bind the parties 
to a non-requirement in a footnote to an inapplicable chart in an 
inapplicable publication. 
At the least, whether a 10 to 1 safety factor is required is 
ambiguous, and therefore construed against Thiokol. See Point V, 
above. 
Third, Thiokol didn't prove that the lack of side-wall 
strength caused the accident (See Facts, above, at 13-15). 
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Uplift forces caused by overfilling breaking loose the bottom of 
the tank is the most likely cause (See Facts, above, at 19-20). 
All of Thiokol's tests after the second failure showed at least 
three times the necessary sidewall strength. Therefore addition-
al strength would have had no effect. Glasso testified that once 
begun, any tear would act like a zipper and be unstoppable. 
POINT VII: BECAUSE THIOKOL CREATED THE PLANS AND SPECIFICATIONS 
AND CLOSELY SUPERVISED ALL WORKf ESPECIALLY THE FIXf THE PARTIES 
ARE ABSOLVED OF RESPONSIBILITY. 
Utah and other law holds that a contractor may rely on the 
plans and specifications. In Paul Mueller Co. v. Cache Valley 
Dairy Assoc.. 657 P.2d 1279 (1982), an owner claimed defective 
manufacture and installation of equipment. The court held that 
the contractor was not responsible if the contractor followed the 
plans and specifications of the owner and was closely supervised: 
Having contracted directly with Maxum and knowing of 
Maxum's close supervision of the entire installation 
process, appellants (subcontractors) had reason to 
expect that Maxum would protect respondent's interests 
by observing and obtaining correction of obvious de-
fects . The trial court correctly found that Maxum bore 
a responsibility for correction of such defects. 
Id. at 1286 (Parenthetical supplied). The above-mentioned quote 
fits the facts in the present case almost identically. Thiokol 
had all the expertise in the world. They had two engineers, one 
full-time expert in tanks and fiberglass, to closely supervise 
the entire installation process. They and they alone were warned 
of the possible weakness in the side-wall, but refused to test 
for such weakness. They alone determined that the splice plate 
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fix, which would correct only the joints, would be sufficient. 
They alone authorized and supervised the repair work. Palmer, on 
the other hand, had little expertise in the area and relied upon 
the fact that Thiokol would act as a responsible party in pro-
tecting against known defects or those which Thiokol should have 
known in the face of serious warnings. 
In Paul Mueller Co., the court went on to distinguish 
another case, indicating that where a manufacturer manufactures 
products for inexperienced purchasers, the manufacturer may bear 
the most responsibility, but when knowledgeable purchasers create 
their own plans and specifications and supervise the work, they 
are the responsible party: 
While the latter (general manufacturer) manufacture 
products destined for retail sale to unknown or poten-
tially inexperienced purchasers, appellants provided 
their products and services to a presumably knowledge-
able contractor in accordance with detailed contract 
specifications. 
Id. at 1286 (Parenthetical supplied). Thiokol's specifications 
above were exhaustive, aside from lengthy matters incorporated by 
reference. Thiokol was warned of defects. Therefore Thiokol, as 
the sophisticated purchaser, was responsible. 
Paul Mueller Co. followed an earlier case, Leininger v. 
Steams-Roger Mft. Co., 404 P.2d 33 (Utah 1965), wherein the 
court held that contractors following plans, specifications and 
directions are not in the same position as a general manufacturer 
supplying goods to the unsophisticated public: 
An important limitation on the rule placing building 
contractors on the same footing as sellers of goods is 
that the contractor is not liable if he has merely 
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carried out the plans, specifications and directions 
given to him since in that case the responsibility is 
assumed by the employer, . . . 
Id. at 36 (Emphasis added)• 
In Leininger, the court recognized that if the plans, 
specifications and directions were "so obviously dangerous that 
no reasonable man would follow them," then the contractor may be 
liable. In the present case, the side-wall thickness as speci-
fied by Thiokol resulted in a 3 to 1 safety factor, disregarding 
the pumps added by Thiokol later. That is not so obviously 
dangerous that no reasonable man would have followed them. 
Thiokol specified and approved a side-wall thickness resulting in 
a 3 to 1 safety factor, if that is less than a usual industry 
standard, they should not now complain. Their own expert said 
that a 3 could be used, but he would want good controls (Tr 365), 
controls Thiokol failed to require. 
Experts testified that Thiokol "got what they specified, 
reviewed, approved," and had installed (TR 1654:14-18). 
POINT VIII: STRICT LIABILITY DOES NOT APPLY IN A COMMERCIAL 
SETTING WHERE THE PURCHASER IS SOPHISTICATED. 
Strict liability was developed to allow an unsophisticated 
individual consumer to recover from any party in the chain of 
manufacture and sale, leaving proportions of fault to those in 
the merchandising chain who have the means to litigate. Thiokol 
now attempts to turn the doctrine on its head, arguing that it 
applies to Thiokol, a corporation and the most sophisticated of 
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all of the parties. The courts, however, have long disallowed 
strict liability for such sophisticated corporations. 
In Scandinavian Airlines System v. United Aircraft, 601 F.2d 
425 (CA9 1979), the plaintiff airline attempted to recover for 
defects in jet engines from the manufacturer. The court indicat-
ed that protection of defenseless consumers and spreading the 
risk was "the fundamental policy" (Id. at 428) behind strict 
liability, quoting the California Supreme Court: 
Essentially, the paramount policy to be promoted by the 
rule is the protection of otherwise defenseless victims 
of manufacturing defects and the spreading throughout 
society of the cost of compensating them. 
Id. at 428. The court found that the manufacturer and the 
purchaser were equals in that regard: 
[W]hether the loss is thrust initially upon the manu-
facturer (United) or consumer (SAS), it is ultimately 
passed on as a cost of doing business included in the 
price of the products of one or the other and thus 
spread over a broad commercial stream. (Citations 
omitted). 
Id. at 428. 
The court found that secondary reasons for protecting 
defenseless individuals through strict liability also did not 
apply: "The consumer's difficulty in inspecting defects . . . " 
(Id. at 428); "the problems of proof inherent in pursuing negli-
gence . . . and warranty . . . remedies . . ." (Id. at 429); and 
problems of privity. The court found that the purchaser airlines 
"had the expertise and personnel to inspect the engines for 
defects." Id. at 429. The airlines also "does not have the lack 
of technical knowledge and expertise which would burden members 
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of the general public in proving negligence." There were also no 
problems showing privity with the manufacturer. 
In the present case, Thiokol had vastly more expertise and 
resources and can better spread the risk, Thiokol not only could 
inspect the tanks, by contract, but engaged a full-time and a 
consulting engineer for that purpose. Thiokol's project engineer 
was familiar with tanks and fiberglass (Gladys, 10:10-13; 11:5-
13; 12:1-3; 12:11; 13:8; 12:19-14; 5; 19:7-22; 22:16-24; 26:2-
10). Thiokol had some of the most sophisticated testing equip-
ment in the world at their disposal. (Exh. 69). There were no 
problems of privity with the manufacturer. 
Attempts by Thiokol to alter the doctrine of strict liabili-
ty to try to recover should not be allowed. 
POINT IX: PALMER IS NOT A MERCHANT UNDER THE UCC. 
70A-2-104 defines a merchant for purposes of determining 
whether or not the UCC applies to that party. Merchant means: 
A person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by 
his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or 
skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved . . . 
U.C.A. 70A-2-104(l). 
Palmer is a plumbing/mechanical contractor who has never 
held itself out as a fiberglass tank manufacturer. All parties 
involved in this case knew that a separate contract would have to 
be entered into with a fiberglass manufacturer. Palmer is not 
one who "dcaals in goods of the kind," nor did Palmer hold itself 
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out as dealing in goods of that kind, nor having knowledge or 
skill peculiar to those goods. 
POINT X: THE TANKS IN QUESTION ARE NOT GOODS UNDER THE UCC 
BECAUSE NOT MOVEABLE. 
U.C.A. 70A-2-105(l) defines goods as things which "are 
moveable at the time of identification to the contract for sale." 
The tanks themselves were not so. The UCC was designed to cover 
moveable goods, not pre-fab constructions as the tanks in ques-
tionf shipped in panels, then permanently joined and affixed to a 
specially designed concrete keyway. 
In Paul Mueller Co. v. Cache Valley Dairy Assoc, 657 P.2d 
1279 (Utah 1982), the court considered how to determine a fixture 
for purposes of the mechanic's lien statute. The court held that 
because certain whey drying equipment was intended by the owner 
to be moved in and out of the building, it was personal property. 
In the present case, the tanks in question were permanently 
attached to concrete by bolts every foot, then covered with 
grout. The tanks in question were pre-fab construction of real 
property not covered by the UCC. 
CONCLUSION 
Thiokol's Brief challenges the Findings of Fact without 
appropriately marshalling the evidence in demonstrating to this 
court that the evidence as marshalled is legally insufficient to 
support the finding. Therefore, the Findings must stand. The 
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Conclusions drawn by the trial court are sustainable as based 
upon the Findings of Fact, 
Thiokol's position on appeal must fail. Thiokol attempts to 
create negligence and fault issues in the trial court's decision 
where there are in fact no such issues. Thiokol would like this 
court to rewrite the specifications for the tanks clearer and 
better than they did in the contract with Interwest. The trial 
court appropriately refused that urging from Thiokol. Thiokol 
got what th€>y specified and should not now be heard to complain. 
When warned to discard the tanks, Thiokol refused. When 
warned, at the least, to do some simple testing, Thiokol refused. 
Thiokol's knowledgeable acceptance of possibly deficient tanks 
assumed the risk of failure. 
Thiokol would have this Court ignore their installation of 
the pumps as a substantial modification while claiming that they 
have the right to revoke the acceptance and sue for breach. 
Lastly Thiokol asks this Court to consider theories other than 
contract for the resolution of this case, including the imposi-
tion of higher than contract standards or strict liability upon 
the manufacturer of the tanks, and that without even addressing 
the issues created by their modifications. All in the absence of 
evidence showing that the tanks were dangerous had they been used 
as specifi€*d. Thiokol must fail. 
The trial court correctly found and the evidence reflects 
that this is a contract case governed by contract principles. 
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. 
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THIS MATTER WAS SUBMITTED to the Court on post-trial briefs 
for Memorandum Decision. After having reviewed at length the 
pleadings, memoranda, depositions, the Court's own notes and 
the exhibits offered at trial this Court holds, primarily for 
reasons set forth in Palmer's and Interwest's post trial 
briefs, against Thiokol and in favor of Interwest and Palmer 
and Fiberglass Structures. Although it is inviting to write a 
lengthy Memorandum Decision addressing each of the numerous 
factual and legal issues raised, this Court declines to do so. 
Each of the issues addressed in the post-trial briefs may merit 
attention, but the parties' attention is directed to the issues 
argued and in the order found in post trial brief filed by 
Palmer. The Court's holding is consistent with the positions 
taken therein and in addition to a few comments which may here 
be appropriate. 
Again, without addressing each of the legal and factual 
issues raised in the trial and explored in the various post 
trial briefs, this Court would find that Thiokol has failed to 
show conclusively or even to a preponderance of the evidence 
the reason for the failure of the tanks. This Court noted 
early on that the cause of the failure was the key issue upon 
which all other issues in this case turned. The reason for the 
failure has not been demonstrated to this Court's satisfaction 
to be a result of noncompliance, by the Defendants, with the 
terms and provisions of the contract. 
Generally speaking and to be addressed more particularly 
later, this Court finds that the contract, prepared and drafted 
by Thiokol, was neither specific or sufficiently clear to 
require certain performance of which Thiokol now complains. 
Specifically and only by way of example, the Court does not 
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find that the contract and specifications required the safety 
factor of ten (10) nor a certain wall thickness. Moreover it 
was not shown that Fiberglass Structures, Interwest or Palmer 
failed to comply with the provisions of the contract in any way 
which caused or resulted in the failure. 
Additionally, this Court finds that many of the principles 
of law suggested to be applicable by Thiokol do not apply in 
this case, as after the first failure the parties in large 
measure modified their relationship with one another in the 
contract and Thiokol undertook a new relationship with the 
other parties in engineering and supervising the modification 
and completion of the tanks in question. Further, that if any 
failure to comply with the terms and provisions of the contract 
occurred, such failure was encouraged, accepted and waived by 
Thiokol. What deficiencies there may have been in the tanks 
was as well or better known to Thiokol than to any of the other 
parties including Fiberglass Structures. But those 
deficiencies, whatever thev were, have not been shown to be the 
cause of failure. 
The Court further finds that the claim by Thiokol for 
replacement of the tanks was excessive. Thiokol did not 
replace three contracted tanks with similar products, but 
rather with far more costly products. The cost for clean up, 
response, down time, overhead, etc. were not only excessive and 
not properly mitigated, but also unsubstantiated. Nor were 
most of them necessarily, naturally and consequentially flowing 
from the fault, if any, by the other parties, but in fact 
flowed from action by Thiokol itself. In addition, most of 
those damages could not have been reasonably foreseen and were 
not, at the time the contract was entered into or during the 
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completion stage of the contract, within the reasonable 
contemplation or expectation of the parties thereto• 
As to the warranty provisions themselves, if in fact they 
were binding upon the parties, would be limited to the cost of 
the replacement of the tanks themselves at the contract price. 
CAUSES OF FAILURE 
Much evidence and testimony was received relative to the 
cause of the failure of the tank. Testimony was that 
Fiberglass Structures failed to properly design and engineer 
the tanks, failed to sufficiently overlap the woven roving, 
failed to use the specified resin, failed to make the wall 
thickness and tensile strength sufficient, failed to conduct 
proper testing and that all of the above contributed to the 
failure. Testimony more specifically was that the hoop 
stresses were so great on a tank completely filled, that the 
wall strength was insufficient to withstand. There was 
contrary testimony however, that there was sufficient tensile 
strength to withstand the hoop stresses anticipated (though 
perhaps not to a safety factor of ten). The coupon test of the 
segments near or similar to where the break occurred were in 
this Court's mind inconclusive. Overlapping of the woven 
roving, as indicated on the coupon test was inappropriately 
controlled and in fact though the coupon test may reveal mass, 
weight, composition, etc., there is some question about the 
accuracy of the overlapping of the woven roving as it was 
disclosed in the coupons. Insufficient testimony was given to 
this Court with respect to the controls placed thereon and in 
fact a close review of the the coupons indicate that there had 
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been a shift in the woven roving during or after testing at the 
overlap area when the length of the coupon is measured against 
the length of the segment from which it was taken. 
Much also has been said relative to the change in the 
method of filling the tanks from gravity feed to overhead 
feed. Though that is a substantial change which in and of 
itself may void any warranties given, the Court was not 
persuaded that that change without more resulted in the 
failure. The evidence of vibration or trauma to the tanks from 
the overhead filling was, to this Court, insufficiently 
persuasive to indicate that it was a causative factor. 
The overhead filling method did however allow for over 
filling of the tank, which this Court finds was the most likely 
cause of the failure, and such over filling would not have 
occurred had the gravity feed system remained in place. 
In that connection, testimony persuasive to the Court, was 
that the most likely cause of the failure was the over filling 
of the tank causing uplift which the tank was not designed to 
withstand. The Court is unconvinced from the testimony of the 
technicians from Thiokol that over filling did not occur. In 
order to believe that over filling did not occur, this Court 
would have to believe that the pumps were turned off just 
minutes before the rupture occurred. The testimony with 
respect to the same was unconvincing and in this Court's mind 
incredible. Most likely the facts were that the tank was over 
filled and had been over filling for some time prior to its 
discovery, causing an uplift, rupturing the bottom of the tank 
which went up the side of the tank causing the entire failure. 
This Court is simply not persuaded given the pumping capacity 
that the space along the top of the tank would be sufficient to 
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allow escape of the fluid with sufficient speed to eliminate 
the uplift pressures at the bottom of the tank. 
DESIGN SPECIFICATIONS 
There has been much testimony and controversy as to whether 
the tanks were built pursuant to the design specification. 
This Court would find that they in fact were. There is little 
question, however, that the tanks were under-designed, that 
they did not have sufficient hoop or tensile strength and 
likely may have eventually failed in any regard. Having so 
found an explanation is needed. This Court does not find that 
NBS/PS 15-69 standards were incorporated with sufficient 
clarity for the designer to be aware of their application and 
specifically with respect to wall thickness and safety 
factors. The Thomas report addressed these very issues to some 
degree and testimony from the stand elaborated thereon. The 
Court is not convinced that the specifications included those 
standards for the reasons argued by Interwest and Palmer. The 
Court is however under the opinion that manufactures of tanks 
such as this (as well as Thiokol) in all likelihood should have 
been aware of the need for higher standards as applied to both 
wall thickness, woven roving overlapping and safety factors. 
The fact remains that Thiokol knew of the wall thickness or 
lack thereof and of the safety concerns and accepted the 
product anyway. Whatever deficiencies there may have been were 
fully accepted by Thiokol. 
TORT - CONTRACT 
This case is entirely controlled by contract. The 
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principles of tort law do not have application and will not be 
considered. The parties agreed between themselves by contract 
as to what duties were being undertaken, what liability and 
damages as a result of the breach would apply. That finding 
and conclusion eliminates a number of claims between each of 
the parties and specifically as against Mr. John Rysgarrd 
personally. Thiokol's claims therein are denied. 
Without going through all of the provisions of the 
contract, this Court finds, as argued by Palmer, that after the 
first failure "Thiokol undertook" and became very much involved 
in the new plans specifications, acceptance, design, 
implementation, and construction of the new tanks. In large 
measure under Thiokol*s supervision, the parties jointly 
constructed the tanks. Thiokol accepted them and the engineer 
placed his stamp of approval on the same. In like measure 
Interwest and Palmer were in large degree "left out of the 
loop" and being left out of the loop is one of the very reasons 
Thiokol is finding itself directly in the liability loop. 
After completion and in addition to the above, the action taken 
by Thiokol to modify the filling mechanism and the over filling 
was Thiokol alone. 
WARRANTY 
Much has been argued and plead with respect to the warranty 
provisions by Palmer, Interwest and Fiberglass Construction. 
Arguments have been heard relative to duration, implementation, 
consideration (expressed and implied), and remedies. 
Warranties were given. Consideration existed even though 
payment was not made and has never been made in full for the 
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tanks. The limitations, however, on the warranty are 
significant and this Court finds that the obligations under the 
warranties would be to simply and only replace the tanks 
involved. The Court would find that all three (3) tanks of 
necessity would have to be replaced, the cost of the same being 
approximately $80,000.00. The failure, however was not a 
warranty matter and no claim thereunder is therefor appropriate. 
CONTRACT AND REMEDIES 
Ambiguities in the contract are to be resolved against 
Thiokol. As to warranty, the Court finds that that is a 
contractual matter. Principles of comparative fault would 
apply in the warranty field but action by Thiokol in this case 
bars recovery. 
There is some issue with respect as to whether Interwest, 
Palmer, or Fiberglass were given the adequate opportunity to 
remedy the alleged breach after the failure. Whether that time 
was sufficient between the failure and when Thiokol contracted 
to have another supplier replace the tanks is uncertain. This 
Court finds that it is not dispositive of the issue and in any 
event the Court would limit the damages to $80,000.00 in any 
event. 
UCC 
There has been much argument with respect to the 
application of the UCC. The parties here are contractors not 
suppliers or merchants as contemplated within the Uniform 
Commercial Code language and therefore provisions of the same 
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Palmer 
are not directly applicable. 
JUDGMENT 
Interwest is awarded Judgment against Thiokol in the sum of 
$229,000.00 plus 10% interest from May 2, 1989. Palmer is 
awarded Judgment against Interwest in the sum of $93,673.70 
plus 10% interest from the same date. 
ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Each party claims, from provisions of the contract, that 
attorney's fees are to be awarded. Consistent with the Court's 
earlier finding of fault in this matter and breach of contract 
connected therewith, attorney's fees are to be awarded to 
Interwest on its claim for the $229,000.99 and to Palmers on 
its claim to $93,673.70. Affidavit and memoranda are invited 
on the issue. 
Dated the 1st day of May, 19! 
Gordon J. Low 
istrict Court Judge 
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THIS MATTER came on before the Court on January 28, 1992 
through February 10, 1992, Plaintiff Interw€»st appearing and being 
represented by its attorneys Steven D. Crawley and Robert C. 
Keller. A. H. Palmer & Sons appeared and was represented by their 
attorney George W. Preston of Logan, Utah and Robert R. Wallace of 
Salt Lake City, Utah; Third Party Defendants, John Rysgaard, dba, 
Fiberglass Structures Company and Fiberglass Structures Company in 
Court and being present and represented by its attorney John 
Daubney of St. Paul, Minnesota; Thiokol Corporation being present 
and being represented by its attorneys Keith Kelly and Anthony 
Quinn of Salt Lake City, Utah; and the Court having on May 1, 1992, 
issued its Memorandum Decision referring to A. H. Palmer & Sons and 
Interwestfs post trial briefs, now makes and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That Interwest is a Utah corporation which maintains its 
principal place of business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
2. Interwest was, at the time the cause of action arose, and 
is presently properly licensed to carry on business of a general 
contractor in the State of Utah. 
3. That R. Roy Palmer and Val W. Palmer are sole general 
partners of A. H. Palmer & Sons and are residents of Cache County, 
Utah. They are properly licensed to carry on the business of a 
plumbing contractor in the State of Utah. 
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4. Thiokol is a Delaware Corporation with its principal 
place of business in Box Elder County, State of Utah. Thiokol is 
the same as Morton Thiokol as it relates to contract documents. 
5. Interwest entered into negotiations with Thiokol under 
which Interwest agreed to construct a waste water treatment 
facility known as building M705 for Thiokol. The contract 
consisted of a Notice to Proceed dated November 23, 1988, Exhibit 
34, which incorporates by reference the terms of Thiokol's form no. 
TC8000CREV10-87 which form incorporates certain defense acquisition 
regulations. (Exhibit 35) 
6. On or about December 1, 1988, Palmers entered into a 
subcontract agreement with Interwest by which Palmer agreed to 
perform labor and provide materials for the construction of 
building M705 (Exhibit 37). 
7. Pursuant to the subcontract agreement Palmer was to 
provide, among other things, three fiberglass waste water storage 
tanks designated as T32, T33 and T34. 
8. Palmer originally arranged to obtain the three tanks from 
Delta Fiberglass, however, Delta was unable to provide the tanks 
because of a higher priority commitment to the Air Force. 
9. On February 28, 1989, Palmer entered into a Purchase 
Order Agreement with Fiberglass Structures under which Fiberglass 
Structures was to build and install tanks T32, T3 3 and T34 on or 
before April 30, 1989. (Exhibit 2) 
10. On April 30, 1989, tanks 32, 33 and 34 were tested with 
water filled from a fire hose. During the test tank T34 failed. 
11. Following the failure of Tank 34 the parties modified 
their contractual relationship with one another. Thiokol undertook 
a direct contractual relationship by commencing direct negotiations 
with Fiberglass Structures in the engineering and supervision of 
the modification for the remanufacture of tank T34 and the repairs 
in accordance with Thiokol's specifications of tanks T32 and T33.| 
The Court further finds that any failure on the part of Interwest, 
A. H. Palmers or Fiberglass Structures, Inc. to comply with the 
terms and provisions of the initial agreement between Interwest and 
Thiokol, were encouraged, accepted and waived by Thiokol by virtue 
of their direct negotiations with Fiberglass Structures. 
12. Under Thiokol's supervision, Fiberglass Structures 
constructed the replacement tank. Thiokol tested and accepted 
Tanks T-32, 33 and 34, and Thiokol's engineer placed his stamp of 
approval on the plans and specifications for the replacement tanks. 
In a like measure, Interwest and Palmer were in a large degree left 
out of the loop of negotiations and responsibility. 
13. On or about May 1, 1989, Thiokol inspected building M705 
and notified Interwest that it considered M705 to be substantially 
complete notwithstanding the rupture of T-34 on April 30, 1989 and 
the necessary repairs to the three tanks by Fiberglass Structures. 
(Exhibit 45) 
14. On May 1, 1989, Palmer issued a guaranty (see Exhibit 
52) for a period of one year on Palmer's contract. 
15. As a condition for Thiokol's acceptance of Fiberglass 
Structures' repair to the tanks T32 and T33 and replacing tank T34, 
Thiokol required an extended warranty directly from Fiberglass 
Structures. On June 13, 1989 Fiberglass Structures gave Thiokol 
an extended warranty for three years (Exhibit 18). 
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16. On May 2, 1989, Thiokol owed Interwest the sum of 
$200,000 which amount draws interest at the rate of 10% per annum. 
That on May 2, 1989, Interwest owed A. H. Palmer & Sons the sum of 
$93,673.70 together with interest at the rate of 10% per annum from 
said date. 
17. At some time after June 2, 1989, Thiokol installed pumps 
to fill tanks T32, T33 and T34 replacing the gravity fill system 
specified in the plans and specifications. 
18. On August 24, 1989, Tank 33 failed and released its 
liquid contents. 
19. The Court finds that Thiokol has failed to show 
conclusively or even by a preponderance of the evidence the reason 
for the failure of tank 33 on August 24, 1989. 
20. The Court received testimony that Fiberglass Structures 
failed to properly design and engineer the tanks, failed to 
sufficiently overlap the woven roving, failed to use a specified 
resin, failed to make the wall thickness and the tensile strength 
sufficient, failed to conduct proper testing and that all of the 
above contributed to the failure. 
21. The Court further heard testimony that the hoop stress 
was so great on the tank, that the wall strength was insufficient 
to withstand the stress. There was contrary testimony however that 
there was sufficient tensile strength to withstand the hoop stress 
anticipated but not to satisfy a safety factor of 10. The coupon 
test of the segments near or similar to where the break occurred 
were in the Court's finding inconclusive. Overlapping of the woven 
roving as indicated on the coupon test was inappropriately 
controlled and in fact, though the coupon test may reveal mass, 
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weight, composition etc., there is some question in the court's 
mind about the accuracy of the overlapping of the woven roving as 
it was disclosed in the coupons. The Court finds that there was 
insufficient testimony given to this Court with regard to the 
controls placed on the manufacture of the tanks. 
22. The failure of tank T-34 on April 30, 1989 was caused by 
a breach of warranty given to Thiokol by Interwest Construction 
Company and A. H. Palmer & Sons, Inc. 
23. Notwithstanding evidence to the contrary the Court finds 
that the tanks were built pursuant to Thiokol's design 
specifications. There is little question, however, that the tanks 
were under-designed, that they did not have sufficient hoop or 
tensile strength and likely may have eventually failed in any 
regard. 
24. The Thomas Report addressed these issues to some degree 
and testimony from the stand elaborated thereon. The Court is not 
convinced that the specifications included those standards for the 
reasons argued by Interwest and Palmer. Th€> Court is, however, of 
the opinion that manufacturers of tanks such as this (as well as 
Thiokol) in all likelihood should have been aware of the need for 
higher standards as applied to wall thickness, woven roving 
overlapping and safety factors. 
25. The fact remains that Thiokol knew of the wall thickness 
or lack thereof and of the safety concerns and accepted tanks T32, 
T33 and T34 with said deficiencies. Whatever deficiencies there 
may have been were fully accepted by Thiokol. 
26. The Court has heard substantial evidence as to the change 
in the method of filling the tanks from gravity feed to overhead 
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feed. Though that is a substantial change which in and of itself 
may void any warranties given, the Court was not persuaded that thei 
method of filling without more resulted in the failure of the tankj 
on August 24, 1989. The evidence of vibration or trauma to the 
tanks from overhead fillings was insufficient to persuade the Court 
that the vibration was a causative factor. 
27. The installation of pumps and an overhead method of 
filling the tanks allowed Thiokol to fill the tanks beyond their 
capacity. The Court finds that this was the most likely cause ofi 
the failure. The Court further finds that an overfilling of the 
tank would not have occurred had the gravity feed system remained 
in place. The Court finds that at least one of the tanks was 
overfilled on prior occasions. Tank T-33 had been overfilling for 
some time prior to its rupture on August 24, 1989. 
28. The Court finds that the overfilling was most likely the| 
cause of the failure which created an uplifting force on the tank 
which the tank was not designed to withstand. The uplifting force 
then caused the tank to rupture at the base of the tank and the 
rupture thereafter propagated up the side of the tank causing the 
entire failure. The court finds that given the pumping capacity 
of the pumps and the testimony relative to the spaces along the top 
of the tank and the man way that there was not sufficient area to 
allow the escape of fluids with sufficient speed to eliminate the 
uplifting pressures at the bottom of the tank. 
29. Warranties were given by Interwest Construction Company, 
A. H. Palmers & Sons and Fiberglass Structures to Thiokol. 
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30. After tank T3 3 failed Thiokol withheld from Interwest the 
sum of $200,000 from the contract. Of this amount, $93,653 was 
withheld from Palmers by Interwest. 
31. The Court finds that Thiokol is the author of the plans 
and specifications of the contract documents as it relates to 
Interwest. 
32. That Interwest and A. H. Palmer executed an agreement! 
Exhibit 37 which provided for the payment of attorney's fees in the 
event of litigation. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court now makes 
and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That the contracts between Thiokol and Interwest and the 
modifications thereto between Thiokol, Interwest, A. H. Palmer and 
Fiberglass Structures were drafted and prepared by Thiokol and by 
reason thereof any ambiguities in the contracts or parts thereof 
such as specifications should be resolved against Thiokol. 
2. This case is controlled entirely under contract law. The 
parties agreed between themselves by contract as to what duties 
were being undertaken and what liability and damages may have 
accrued as a result of breach of contract. 
3. The Court concludes that after the failure of tank T34 
Thiokol entered into what amounted to a separate agreement with 
Fiberglass Structures. 
4. The Court concludes that Thiokol negotiated for and 
bargained with Fiberglass Structures for the remanufacture of tank 
34 and the repairs to tanks 32 and 33 on terms and conditions 
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specified by Thiokol. Thiokol bargained for a separate warranty 
from Fiberglass Structures on the retro-fitted tanks. ] 
5. The court concludes that under Thiokol!s supervision, the 
parties jointly constructed the tanks. Thiokol accepted the tanks 
and the engineer placed his stamp of approval on the same. In a 
like measure, Interwest and Palmers were, in a large degree, left 
out of the loop and being left out of the loop is one of the very 
reasons Thiokol is finding itself directly in the liability loop. 
6. The Court concludes that the most likely cause of the 
failure was the overfilling of the tanks causing uplift which the 
tank was not designed to withstand. 
7. The Court concludes that Thiokol has failed to prove by 
a preponderance of the evidence the cause of the tank failure on 
August 26, 1989. 
8. The Court concludes that the failure of the tanks was not 
a warranty matter and therefore no claim under warranty is 
appropriate in this case. 
9. The Court concludes that NBS/PS15-69 standards were not 
incorporated into the contract by Thiokol with sufficient clarity 
in the contract for the designer and manufacturer to be aware of 
their application; specifically with respect to wall thickness and 
safety factors. 
10. There have been issues raised between the parties as to 
whether or not Interwest, Palmer and Fiberglass Structures are 
liable under the theory of comparative fault as it applies to the 
warranty. The Court concludes that the action by Thiokol in this 
case in overfilling the tanks bars recovery by Thiokol under the 
provisions of warranty. 
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11. That the contract prepared and drafted by Thiokol was 
neither specific or sufficiently clear to require certain 
performance of which Thiokol now complains. Specifically and only 
by way of example the Court concludes that the contract and 
speficiations did not require a safety factor of 10 nor a certain 
wall thickness. The Court further concludes that Fiberglass 
Structures, Interwest Construction Company or A. H. Palmer & Sons 
did not fail to comply with the provisions of the contract in any 
way which caused or resulted in the failure claimed by Thiokol. 
12. The Court concludes that Interwest, A. H. Palmer & Sons, 
Fiberglass Structures are contractors and are not suppliers or 
merchants as contemplated within the language of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, therefore provisions of the Uniform Commercial 
Code as it relates to this case, are inapplicable. 
13. That Plaintiff Interwest Construction, a Utah 
corporation, is hereby awarded a judgment against Thiokol 
Corporation in the sum of $200,000 together with 10% interest from 
May 2, 1989 to the date of judgment and thereafter at the rate of 
12% per annum. 
14. That R. Roy Palmer and Val W. Palmer, dba, A. H. Palmer 
& Sons is entitled to judgment against Interwest in the sum of 
$93,673.70, together with 10% interest from the 2nd day of May, 
1989. 
15. Pursuant to stipulation between the parties the 
attorney's fees awarded herein are to be determined by separate 
hearing. 
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16. That judgment should enter dismissing Interwest 
Construction Company's Complaint with prejudice against R. Roy 
Palmer and Val W. Palmer, dba, A. H. Palmer & Sons. 
17. That judgment should be entered on the counterclaim of 
R. Roy Palmer and Val W. Palmer, dba, A. H. Palmer & Sons, against 
Interwest Construction Company as set forth by the counterclaim of 
A. H. Palmer & Sons. 
18. That judgment should be entered dismissing the third 
party complaint of R. Roy Palmer and Val W. Palmer, dba, A. H. 
Palmer & Sons against John Rysgaard, dba, Fiberglass Structures| 
Company and Fiberglass Structures Company, Inc. j 
19. That judgment should enter dismissing the third party 
complaint by Fiberglass Structures and tank company aka Fiberglass 
Structures Company of St. Paul, Minnesota and John Rysgaard against 
Thiokol Corporation. 
20. That judgment should enter dismissing the counterclaim 
by John Rysgaard, dba, Fiberglass Structures Company and Fiberglass 
Structures Company, Inc. against R. Roy Palmer and Val W. Palmer, 
dba, A. H. Palmer & Sons. 
21. That judgment should enter dismissing Thiokol 
Corporation's counterclaim against Fiberglass Structures Company, 
Inc., and John Rysgaard, dba, Fiberglass Structures Company. 
22. That judgment should enter dismissing Thiokol 
Corporation's counterclaim and cross claims against R. Roy Palmer 
and Val W. Palmer, dba, A. H. Palmer & Sons, Fiberglass Structures, 
Inc. of St. Paul, Minnesota and John Rysgaard and Interwest 
Construction. 
11 
23. The failure of Tank 34 on April 30, 1989 was caused by 
a breach of the warranties given to Thiokol by both Interwest and 
A. H. Palmers. 
DATED this & day of 
W&ori J.' Low, 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
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I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
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WOOD &' WOOD 
500 Eagle Gate Tower 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
4 Triad Center #50 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180 
Keith A. Kelly 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
79 South Main #400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
on this JJi) day of August, 19/2. 
Steven D. Crawley 
WALSTAD & BABCOCK 
254 West 400 South, 2nd Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 841012 
John Daubney 
1010 Degree of Honor Bldg. 
325 Cedar Street 
St. Paul, MN 55101-1012 
Robert C. Keller 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
10 Exchange Place #1100 
P.O. Box 4500j( 
Salt Lake City, VT 84145 
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Robert R. Wallace 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 
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Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2970 
George W. Preston 
PRESTON & CHAMBERS 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Third Party Plaintiffs 
31 Federal Avenue 
Logan, Utah 84321 
(801) 752-3551 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
INTERWEST CONSTRUCTION, 
a Utah corporation 
Plaint i f f , 
v s . 
* 
* 
* 
* 
SECOND 
A M E N D E D 
J U D G M E N T 
R. ROY PALMER and VAL W. 
PALMER, dba, A. H. PALMER 
& SONS 
Defendants. 
R. ROY PALMER and VAL W. * 
PALMER, dba, A. H. PALMER 
& SONS * 
Third Party Plaintiffs * 
vs. * 
JOHN RYSGAARD, dba, * 
FIBERGLASS STRUCTURES COMPANY 
and FIBERGLASS STRUCTURES * 
COMPANY, INC. 
Third Party Defendants 
FIBERGLASS STRUCTURES AND 
TANK COMPANY, fka, FIBERGLASS * 
STRUCTURES COMPANY of St. 
Paul Inc. * 
Third Party Plaintiff * 
C i v i l No. 90-321 
vs. V""-n -:' •»tn -"• Case No. 
rt~J2L 
r: .. ihj^fLk 
- iw. ... i \ 
THIOKOL CORPORATION * 
Third Party Defendant * 
THIS MATTER came on before the Court on the January 28 through 
February 10, 1992, Plaintiff appearing personally and the Court 
having made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, now enters the following Judgment and Decree: 
1. That Plaintiff Interwest Construction, a Utah 
corporation, is hereby awarded a judgment against Thiokol 
Corporation in the sum of $200,000 together with interest at the 
rate of 10% per annum from the 2nd day of May, 1989, to the date 
of judgment and thereafter at the rate of 12% per annum. 
2. That R. Roy Palmer and Val W. Palmer, dba, A. H. Palmer 
& Sons is hereby awarded judgment against the Plaintiff Interwest 
Construction Company in the amount of $93,673.70, together with 
interest at the rate of 10% per annum from the 2nd day of May, 
1989, to the date of judgment and thereafter at the rate of 12% 
per annum. 
3. That Interwest Construction Company, a Utah corporation, 
is hereby awarded judgment against Thiokol Corporation for costs 
of Court in the amount of $ . 
4. That R. Roy Palmer and Val W. Palmer, dba, A. H. Palmer 
& Sons are hereby awarded judgment against Interwest for costs of 
Court in the sum of $ , to bear interest at the rate of 12% 
per annum. 
5. That Interwest Construction Company fs Complaint is hereby 
dismissed with prejudice against R. Roy Palmer, Val W. Palmer, dba, 
A. H. Palmer & Sons. 
o 
6. That the third party complaint of R. Roy Palmer and Val 
W. Palmer, dba, A. H. Palmer & Sons against John Rysgaard, dba, 
Fiberglass Structure Company and Fiberglass Structure Company, 
Inc., is hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
7. That the third party complaint by Fiberglass Structures, 
aka, Fiberglass Structures Company and John Rysgaard against 
Thiokol Corporation is hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
8. That the counterclaim by John Rysgaard, dba, Fiberglass 
Structures Company and Fiberglass Structures Company, Inc. against 
R. Roy Palmer and Val W. Palmer, dba, A. H. Palmer & Sons is hereby 
dismissed with prejudice. 
9. That the counterclaim by Thiokol Corporation against 
Fiberglass Structure Company, Inc., John Rysgaard, dba, Fiberglass 
Structure Company, Inc., is hereby dismissed with prejudice. I 
10. That the counterclaim and cross claim by Thiokol 
Corporation against R. Roy Palmer and Val W. Palmer, dba, A. H. 
Palmer & Sons, Fiberglass Structures and Interwest Corporation are 
hereby dismissed with prejudice.i 
^ 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the above and foregoing SECOND AMENDED JUDCMENT to the following: 
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